JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC. v. CA 260 SCRA 319 August 5, 1996 (CASE DIGEST)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

POLICE POWER

JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., and KARY INTERNATIONAL INC., petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MA. NIEVES CONFESSOR, then Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, HON. JOSE BRILLANTES, in his capacity as acting Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and HON. FELICISIMO JOSON, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, respondents.

G.R. No. 120095. August 5, 1996

KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS:

The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP for brevity) filed a class suit on January 27, 1995 assailing that the Department Order No. 3 which establishes various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the former and other related issuance, principally contending that the said orders, 1.)violated the constitutional right to travel; 2.) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3.) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of law. FETMOP also averred that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and in gross violation of the constitutional right to life liberty and property. FETMOP prayed for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against the orders.

JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. (JMM for brevity) and Kary International, Inc. (Kary for brevity) filed a motion for intervention in the civil case which was granted by the trial court on February 15, 1995. However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an order denying petitioner's prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the compliant. An appeal was made to the trial court regarding its decision but it was also however, dismissed. As a consequences, ARB requirement was issed. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision and concluded that the said issuance constituted a valid exercise of Police power.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the the said issuance is a valid exercise of Police Power.

RULING:

Yes, the ARB requirement and questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of Police Power by the State. The proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of police power by the state particularly when their conduct afffects either the execution of a legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your property in such a fashion so as to not disturb others) it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.

In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the right of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or profession. Professional leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.

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LUTZ v. ARANETA 98 PHIL. 145 December 22, 1955 (CASE DIGEST)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
POLICE POWER

WALTER LUTZ, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate of the deceased Antonio Jayme Ledesma, plaintiff-appellant v. J. ANTONIO ARANETA, as collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-apppelle

G.R No. L-7856. December 22, 1955

REYES, J.B L., J.:

FACTS:

Appelant in this case Walter Lutz in his capacity as the Judicial Administrator of the intestate of the deceased Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of the Internal Revenue the total sum of fourteen thousand six hundred sixty six and forty cents (P 14, 666.40) paid by the estate as taxes, under section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 567, also known as the Sugar Adjustment Act, for the crop years 1948-1949 and 1949-1950. Commonwealth Act. 567 Section 2 provides for an increase of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar on a graduated basis, on each picul of sugar manufacturer; while section 3 levies on the owners or persons in control of the land devoted tot he cultivation of sugarcane and ceded to others for consideration, on lease or otherwise - "a tax equivalent to the difference between the money value of the rental or consideration collected and the amount representing 12 per centum of the assessed value of such land. It was alleged that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action was dismissed by the CFI thus the plaintiff appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the tax imposition in the Commonwealth Act No. 567 are unconstitutional.

RULING:

Yes, the Supreme Court held that the fact that sugar production is one of the greatest industry of our nation, sugar occupying a leading position among its export products; that it gives employment to thousands of laborers in the fields and factories; that it is a great source of the state's wealth, is one of the important source of foreign exchange needed by our government and is thus pivotal in the plans of a regime committed to a policy of currency stability. Its promotion, protection and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence it was competent for the legislature to find that the general welfare demanded that the sugar industry be stabilized in turn; and in the wide field of its police power, the law-making body could provide that the distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its components to enable it to resist the added strain of the increase in taxes that it had to sustain.

The subject tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily a valid exercise of police power.

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LOZANO v. MARTINEZ G.R No. L-63419. December 18, 1986 (CASE DIGEST)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
POLICE POWER

FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch XX, Manila, and HONORABLE JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Manila, respondents.

X X X X X X

G.R. No. L-63419. December 18, 1986

YAP, J.:

FACTS:

This is a consolidated case, the petition arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the BP 22 also known as Bouncing Check Law. The defendant in these case moved seasonably to quash the information on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial court, except in one case, which is the subject of G.R No. 75789, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have come to the court for remedy. Those who question the constitutionality of the said statute insist the following ground:

1) It offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt;

2) it impairs freedom of contract;

3) it contravenes the equal protection clause;

4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and

5) its enactment is flawed in the sense that during its passage the interim Batasan violated the constitutional provision prohibiting to a bill on Third Reading.

ISSUE:

Whether or not BP 22 or the Bouncing Check Law is unconstitutional.

RULING:

No, the enactment of the assailed statute is a valid exercise of Police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of debt ex contractu, but certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to prescribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power. 

The enactment of the said statute is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.

Full text: The Lawphil Project

YNOT v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. 74457. March 20, 1987 (CASE DIGEST)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

POLICE POWER

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and the REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.

G.R. No. 74457. March 20, 1987

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner in this case transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. Petitioner sued for recovery, and the trial Court of Iloilo issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of twelve thousand pesos (P 12, 000.00). After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the said carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the E.O, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said Executive Order is unconstitutional.

RULING:

Yes, though police power was invoked by the government in this case for the reason that the present condition demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs, it does not however, comply with the second requisite for a valid exercise of the said power which is, "that there be a lawful method." The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing. 

The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of Police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. To justify the State in the imposition of its authority in behalf of the public, it must be:

1) The interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference;

2) that the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

Full text: The Lawphil Project

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION v. CITY OF MANILA January 20, 2009 (CASE DIGEST)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

POLICE POWER

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION petitioner v. CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, respondents.

January 20, 2009

TINGA, J.:

FACTS:

The City Mayor, Alfredo Lim signed into law Ordinance No. 7774 which is entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" on December 3, 1992.

petitioners in this case filed a case before the RTC praying that the ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional. RTC eventually rendered its decision declaring the said ordinance null and void. It was then elevated to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutional of the ordinance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said Ordinance is null and Void

RULING:

Yes, though the goal of the ordinance According to the Supreme Court, is to eliminate and if not, minimize the use of covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals by themselves are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. However, the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his cynicism.

The Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as police power measure. It must appear that the interest of the public, generally, as distinguished from those of particular class, require an interference with private rights and that the means employed be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of the private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purpose of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.


See Full Text: SC Decision