ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V. SECRETARY OF DAR, G.R. No. 78742 (175 SCRA 343), July 14, 1989

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
POLICE POWER

G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners, 
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989

ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioners, 
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, respondents.

G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989

INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCENA and ROBERTO TAAY, respondents.

G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989

NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners, 
vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:

These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988"

In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to the Congress and not to the President, the also allege that Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229 should be annulled for violation of the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process and equal protection. They contended that the taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation which such payment is not contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.

In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President and that the said executive orders violate the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation which was denied to the petitioners.

In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules of the decree. They therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to issue the said rules.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police power or Power of Eminent Domain.

RULING:

Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there are traditional distinction between the police power and the power of eminent domain, property condemned under police power is noxious or intended for noxious purpose, the compensation for the taking of such property is not subject to compensation, unlike the taking of the property in Eminent Domain or the power of expropriation which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner of the property expropriated.

SEE FULL TEXT IN THIS LINK:

Full Text from Lawphil

LET'S DIGEST (A GUIDE ON HOW TO DIGEST A CASE)

LET'S DIGEST 

(A GUIDE ON HOW TO DIGEST A CASE)

Hi guys! I'm here to tell you some tips on how to properly digest a case. As a law student, we are often asked by our professors as a requirement to digest cases which are normally assigned by your professors for the whole semester. These cases contains the real life application of the principles and theories that are discussed in the law. Some cases are long and some are short, some can reach up to 30 pages and some reach only 2 to 5 pages, it depends on how critical the case is. 

Now, some students have difficulty in digesting these cases whether they are long or short. Probably because of lack of experience in digesting cases or probably this is a new concept for you. Digesting a case is more like a book summary, you read a novel or a story then you summarize the story. Same thing with case digest, you read the case and summarize the whole case into something comprehensive for a layman and of course for yourself. 

Here are some tips I'd like to share with you today. Some of these tips are supported by different sources from other blogs on How to Write a Case Digest. I'll be posting the links of these sources in the end of this blog.

WHY SHOULD YOU DIGEST CASES?

The cases that will be assigned to you will be a huge part of the discussions and recitations. It's really hard to answer a question which you do not know the answer, sometimes, you've read the cases by heart and understand the doctrines inside it but because there are tons of cases to read you might find yourself mixing facts and ruling up and that's bad too. You digest cases in order for you to have guidelines and overview regarding the case you've read. Digest contains brief facts of the case, issue which needs to be resolve in the case and the decision and solution given by the court. You cannot possibly memorize everything except if you're a boy genius or someone who have a photographic memory.

Some professors do not allow open books but allow open written notes, without a copy of a full text you're a goner and you'd probably mix up the facts of the cases assigned. When you have a written digest, you can follow the discussion and probably even prepare for the questions that might be asked by the professors with the little life save you call, "Case Digest".

Some professors, also require that you submit your case digests either week, or by the end of the semester. Don't do the digests, and it's your loss. Some professors give considerations for the effort given in the digest. Some professors put an incomplete (INC) mark to those who did not pass their cases or those who have incomplete case digest. It may not be possible for your professors to read all your digests but it's worth the effort to impress your professor with a complete and magnificent case digest.

STEP 1: GET YOURSELF A FULL TEXT COPY OF THE CASE.

Why? I'll tell you why. You want to appreciate and understand a story? Read the book and watch the movie after. As a general rule you DO NOT! I repeat, YOU DO NOT read the digest first before the full text of the case. That is a mortal sin for professors if they found out you've only read the case digest and not the full text. It gives you that image of being lazy, and that's a big problem with the capital "P" in it. But as the saying goes, "if there's a general rule, there's an exception" which is, if you are hopeless already and you have to finish the case before the end of the world which is the class itself. But this is not advisable some professors are tricky and try to ask questions that are found in the full text and most of the time are being overlooked by the students (Such as the date, the justice who penned the case, the names of the petitioner and respondent, etc.). SO DO YOURSELF A FAVOR, GET A FULL TEXT COPY OF THE CASE! You can get the full text of the case either through the internet or directly from your law library.

HERE'S A TIP:

• You can just leave the copy of the list of cases to the librarian or the Xerox Copy Person (XCP because I do not know how those people are called.) and ask him/her kindly if he/she could go look for the listed cases there, if they are kind enough to fetch the case for you then you're lucky, and perhaps a tip would be nice to show your appreciation. Make sure you give them the case list 2 days or a day before you need the copies of the full text. It's not easy to xerox all those cases you know. If not? Well, it's one hell of a long journey for you looking at the SCRA one by one. 
• I prefer getting the full text of the case directly from the library than the internet. Why? You can see the rulings directly at the first page of the SCRA, it's already categorized according to a particular topic of law related/included in the case. It's much easier to digest.

STEP 2: DON'T JUST LOOK AT IT, READ IT!

You got the case? Good. Now, you read it. Have this relationship with the case, you pay close attention to the case and while you're at it perhaps you might want to write some notes regarding the case not so hard of a start isn't it? Reading the case takes some time, but take note of the important things just in case, these are:

• Full names of the petitioner and the respondent;
• Date of the decision of case;
• Important places in the case (specific address, name of the boat, name of the street, etc.)
• Justice who penned the case;and 
• Other information that seem important to the case.

These things are important specially in Criminal Cases specially the time and place where the crime was committed.

Now, some cases are interesting, criminal cases, cases relating to annulment and the likes. However, you'll have a problem with cases that will not really spark your interest. For me, cases relating to tax and corporations are incomprehensible and boring, but you have to read these cases no matter what. It's worth the effort guys. If you can read fifty shades of grey or the twilight saga then you can also read those cases. Think that your life and grade depend on it. Put humor in the cases, something that will remind you of what is that case all about.

STEP 3: NOW WRITE!

Don't just think bout them, ink them. Remember that a case digest should be a page short only as much as possible, you're not rewriting the full text, you are summarizing it. Now there are formalities which are to observed in writing down your case digest, I will discuss them step by step.

STEP 3.A: NAME OF THE CASE, GR. No., DATE and JUSTICE WHO PENNED THE CASE.

This is important. If the full text is entitled "Maria Corazon de Jesus Victoria Trinidad vs. Manuel Gabriel" or if the case have many petitioners and respondents, the you can shortcut it into (for my example) "Trinidad v. Gabriel" Last name of the petitioner and last name of respondent.

(based on an actual case. Note: I removed the name of petitioner and respondent)

Then after the case title, under that, you put the G.R Number of the case and the date of the decision of the case beside it.

(based on an actual case. Note: I removed the name of petitioner and respondent)

After writing those two, you write the surname of the Justice who penned the decision.

(based on an actual case. Note: I removed the name of petitioner and respondent)

Your Case Caption should look like this (based on my example earlier):

TRINIDAD v. GABRIEL

G.R. No. XXXXXXX, August 30, 1950

DE GUZMAN, J.:

STEP 3.B: FACTS

Facts are the brief story of the case. You should write what happened in the case, who are the petitioner and the respondents, what is the decision of the Court of Appeals and Lower Courts. Facts should be brief as possible. A digest is a summary of the full text and not another copy of the full text.

STEP 3.C: ISSUE

Issue for me, always starts with WHETHER OR NOT followed by the issue that is related to your topic. For example, the topic is warrant of arrest and the issue in the case is the validity of the warrant, then your issue should be, WHETHER OR NOT the warrant is valid.

STEP 3.D: RULING/HELD

This is the decision of the SUPREME COURT. I repeat, this is the DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT not the ruling of any lower court regarding the issue you raised in your issue portion. So, The ISSUE is the question, the RULING is the answer. 

You can use Ruling or Held, whatever is comfortable for you. The point is, you or other people should see the decision of the court whether it is granted or dismissed and the rationale for such decision. Decision should answer the issue as i said earlier, if you put a decision that does not answer your issue then you have a problem discussing the case.

STEP 3.E: HOW IT SHOULD LOOK LIKE

TRINIDAD v. GABRIEL

G.R. No. XXXXXXX, August 30, 1950

DE GUZMAN, J.:

FACTS:

ISSUE: 

RULING:

STEP 3.F: SAMPLE DIGEST

BIRAOGO v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

G.R No. 192935. December 7, 2010

MENDOZA, J.:

FACT:

E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration and submit their findings and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that. 

• It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation;
• The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new office was inexistent like the Truth Commission;
• The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and vesting it the power duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
• It violates the equal protection clause 

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.

RULING:

Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.

4. CONCLUSION

So That's all that you need to know with regards to digesting cases. I hope these helps and please let me know what you think about digesting cases. We're also open for other suggestions just leave it on the comments section. THANK YOU AND GOOD LUCK WITH YOUR DIGESTS!

5. REFERENCE 

> LawFacilitate

> Diory's Diction

> Uber Digests

SARMIENTO V. MISON, G. R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987 (CASE DIGEST)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I CASE DIGEST

POLITICAL LAW
POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE

Ulpiano P. Sarmiento III and Juanito G. Arcilla v. Salvador Mison in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS and Guillermo Carague in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET

G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987

Padilla, J.:

FACTS:

Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then President (Corazon) Aquino. The said appointment made by the President is being questioned by petitioner Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla who are both taxpayers, members of the bar, and both Constitutional law professors, stating that the said appointment is not valid since the appointment was not submitted to the Commission On Appointment (COA) for approval. Under the Constitution, the appointments made for the "Heads of Bureau" requires the confirmation from COA.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the appointment made by the President without the confirmation from COA is valid.

HELD:

Yes, under the 1987 Constitution, Heads of Bureau are removed from the list of officers that needed confirmation from the Commission On Appointment. It enumerated the four (4) groups whom the President shall appoint:

• Heads of the Executive Departments, Ambassadors, other public minister or consuls, Officers of the Armed Forces from the rank of Colonel or Naval Captain, and Other officers whose appointments are vested in him in him in this Constitution;

The above-mentioned circumstance is the only instance where the appointment made by the President that requires approval from the COA and the following instances are those which does not require approval from COA:

• All other Officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;
• Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
• Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

Note: See full text here

Full Text from Lawphil.net

DE CASTRO V. JBC, G.R. No. 191342 April 2, 2010 (CASE DIGEST)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I CASE DIGEST

TOPIC: POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE

(Enactment of the DE CASTRO v. JBC case by San Beda College of Law, Section 1-N)

ATTY. AMADOR Z. TOLENTINO JR., (IBP Governor - Southern Luzon), and ATTY. ROLAND B. INTING (IBP Governor - Eastern Visayas), petitioners, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), respondent.

G. R. No. 191342, April 20, 2010.

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:

This is a consolidated case which assails the constitutionality of the action of former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo by appointing a Chief Justice 7 days after the Presidential election in 2010.

After the compulsory retirement of former Chief Justice Reynato Puno, the position of Chief Justice was left vacant. Section 4 (1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution states that, "vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from occurrence thereof," from a, "List of nominees prepared by the Judicial Bar Council for every vacancy" furthermore, Section 15, Article VII was also taken into consideration which prohibits the President or the Acting President from making appointments within two (2) months immediately before the next Presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The JBC agreed that the vacant position must be filled and there were five (5) candidates for the position from the most senior of the Associates of the court and one of them is Associate Justice Reynato C. Corona who was chosen by the President and was appointed for the position of Chief Justice. 

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice since the Constitution do not apply to the Supreme Court. If the framers of the Constitution intended the prohibition to apply in the Supreme Court then it should have expressly stated it in the Constitution. 

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the President can appoint the successor of the Chief Justice..

RULING:

Yes, the President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice as the prohibitions in the Constitution.

If the framers of the Constitution intends that the prohibition shall apply to the appointment of Chief Justice, then they should have expressly stated it in the Constitution under Section 15 (THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT), Article VII and Section 4 (1), Article VIII (JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT). 

Section 14, Section 15 and Section 16 refers only to the appointments made in the Executive Department.


NOTE:

SEE FULL TEXT IN THIS LINK DE CASTRO v. JBC (Full text)

BIRAOGO V. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION 2010, G. R. No. 192935. December 7, 2010 (CASE DIGEST)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I CASE DIGEST

TOPIC: POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, petitioner, v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, respondent.

G.R No. 192935. December 7, 2010

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, RR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., petitioner, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, respondent.

G.R. No. 193036. December 7, 2010

MENDOZA, J.:

FACT:

E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration and submit their findings and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that. 

• It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation;
• The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new office was inexistent like the Truth Commission;
• The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and vesting it the power duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
• It violates the equal protection clause 

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.

RULING:

Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.

See Full Text Here: Full Text

IRENEO ROQUE V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, G.R No. L-25373 July 1, 1976 (CASE DIGEST)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I CASE DIGEST

ISSUE: POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE

IRENEO ROQUE, petitioner-appellant, v. THE HONORABLE, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS; THE HONORABLE, THE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT and JOSE FACUN, respondents-appellees.

G.R. No. L-25373. July 1, 1976

FERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Roque allege that he had been in occupation of the disputed portion since 1937, for the whole of Lot No. 4507. Likewise Respondent Facun filed his homestead application on the same land in 1935 and submitted the final proof therefore in 1939.

In settling the dispute, the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources decided in favor of Roque but upon re investigation it is found out that Roque submitted his sales application for the disputed portion in 1948, only during the course of the investigation of his protest and it was verified during the re investigation of this case that the appellee (Roque) entered upon the disputed portion in 1951 only. So the President, through respondent Assistant Executive Secretary awarded the land in favor of the respondent Facun.

The petitioner prayed that the order of the respondent Honorable Director of Lands and the decision of the respondent Honorable Assistant Executive Secretary, be set aside on the alleged ground that the said order of the Director of Lands was issued with grave abuse of discretion, consisting of unqualified reliance and the biased report and recommendation. And said that the decision of the Honorable Executive Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction and committed a grave abuse of discretion disregarding the sales award of the land in question in favor of the herein petitioner having already paid is for the price of the same, and praying further that the decision of the Honorable Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources be sustained.

Respondent Jose Facun, through Atty. Cipriano A. Tan, filed an answer to the petition denying specifically the allegation of abuse of discretion, arbitrariness and excess of jurisdiction of the Honorable Director of Lands and Assistant Executive Secretary is perfectly valid.

ISSUE:

      Whether or not Assistant Executive Secretary lacks the power to overrule the descision of Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources?

RULING:

No, to contend that the Office of the President, through respondent Assistant Executive Secretary, lacks the power to overrule the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources is to betray lack of awareness of the implications of what Justice Laurel referred to in Villena v. Secretary of the Interior as   "  As was further stressed by him: "Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President…. the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and Promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptive the acts of the Chief Executive.” 

            

The President has control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices and under Pelaez v. Auditor General  "The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers."  Clearly then, there is nothing to prevent the President to disapprove the act of a department head.

Assistant Executive Secretary of the President is correct for sustaining the award by the Director of Lands of a homestead application and thus overruling the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, because it is in conformity with the policy of the law. Petitioner, himself a previous beneficiary of the statute, would seek to add to his holding by a sales application. The prevailing party, private respondent Jose Facun, on the other hand, had applied for the disputed lot as a homesteader as far back as 1935, and had submitted his final proof in 1948.

See Full Text Here: Full Text

LEAGUE OF CITIES v. COMELEC G.R. No. 176951 August 24, 2010 (CASE DIGEST)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

POLITICAL LAW

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by

MAYOR JERRY P.  TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P.  TREÑAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, Respondents.

CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF  SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, Petitioners-In-Intervention.                     

G.R. No. 176951

  

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P.  TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P.  TREÑAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN; MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN,

PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL; and MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, Respondents.

CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF

TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, Petitioners-In-Intervention.

G.R. No. 177499

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P.  TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P.  TREÑAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, Petitioners,  v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, Respondents.

CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF  SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM,

G.R. No.  178056, AUGUST 24, 2010

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

Supreme Court en banc, struck down the subject 16 of the Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Respondents filed a petition for reconsideration which was denied by the Honorable Court. A second motion for reconsideration was also denied until on the 18th of November 2008, the judgement became final and executory.

The Court then on the 19th of December 2009, unprecedentedly reversed its decision upholding the constitutionally of the Cityhood Laws.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court could reverse the decision it already rendered.

RULING:

  Yes, The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play.  In short, the operative fact doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself.

         Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by the “new cities” or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and effective.  This does not mean that the Cityhood Laws are valid for they remain void.  Only the effects of the implementation of these unconstitutional laws are left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play to innocent people who may have relied on the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Court’s declaration of their unconstitutionality.

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JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC. v. CA 260 SCRA 319 August 5, 1996 (CASE DIGEST)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

POLICE POWER

JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., and KARY INTERNATIONAL INC., petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MA. NIEVES CONFESSOR, then Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, HON. JOSE BRILLANTES, in his capacity as acting Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and HON. FELICISIMO JOSON, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, respondents.

G.R. No. 120095. August 5, 1996

KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS:

The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP for brevity) filed a class suit on January 27, 1995 assailing that the Department Order No. 3 which establishes various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the former and other related issuance, principally contending that the said orders, 1.)violated the constitutional right to travel; 2.) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3.) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of law. FETMOP also averred that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and in gross violation of the constitutional right to life liberty and property. FETMOP prayed for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against the orders.

JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. (JMM for brevity) and Kary International, Inc. (Kary for brevity) filed a motion for intervention in the civil case which was granted by the trial court on February 15, 1995. However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an order denying petitioner's prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the compliant. An appeal was made to the trial court regarding its decision but it was also however, dismissed. As a consequences, ARB requirement was issed. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision and concluded that the said issuance constituted a valid exercise of Police power.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the the said issuance is a valid exercise of Police Power.

RULING:

Yes, the ARB requirement and questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of Police Power by the State. The proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of police power by the state particularly when their conduct afffects either the execution of a legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your property in such a fashion so as to not disturb others) it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.

In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the right of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or profession. Professional leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.

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LUTZ v. ARANETA 98 PHIL. 145 December 22, 1955 (CASE DIGEST)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
POLICE POWER

WALTER LUTZ, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate of the deceased Antonio Jayme Ledesma, plaintiff-appellant v. J. ANTONIO ARANETA, as collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-apppelle

G.R No. L-7856. December 22, 1955

REYES, J.B L., J.:

FACTS:

Appelant in this case Walter Lutz in his capacity as the Judicial Administrator of the intestate of the deceased Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of the Internal Revenue the total sum of fourteen thousand six hundred sixty six and forty cents (P 14, 666.40) paid by the estate as taxes, under section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 567, also known as the Sugar Adjustment Act, for the crop years 1948-1949 and 1949-1950. Commonwealth Act. 567 Section 2 provides for an increase of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar on a graduated basis, on each picul of sugar manufacturer; while section 3 levies on the owners or persons in control of the land devoted tot he cultivation of sugarcane and ceded to others for consideration, on lease or otherwise - "a tax equivalent to the difference between the money value of the rental or consideration collected and the amount representing 12 per centum of the assessed value of such land. It was alleged that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action was dismissed by the CFI thus the plaintiff appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the tax imposition in the Commonwealth Act No. 567 are unconstitutional.

RULING:

Yes, the Supreme Court held that the fact that sugar production is one of the greatest industry of our nation, sugar occupying a leading position among its export products; that it gives employment to thousands of laborers in the fields and factories; that it is a great source of the state's wealth, is one of the important source of foreign exchange needed by our government and is thus pivotal in the plans of a regime committed to a policy of currency stability. Its promotion, protection and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence it was competent for the legislature to find that the general welfare demanded that the sugar industry be stabilized in turn; and in the wide field of its police power, the law-making body could provide that the distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its components to enable it to resist the added strain of the increase in taxes that it had to sustain.

The subject tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily a valid exercise of police power.

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